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Objective: We aimed to retrospectively reconstruct the
timing of transmission events and pathways in order to
understand why extensive preventive measures and
investigations were not sufficient to prevent new cases.
Methods: We extracted available information from
patient charts to describe cases and to compare them
to the normal population of the ward. We conducted a
cohort study to identify risk factors for pathogen
acquisition. We sequenced the available isolates to
determine the phylogenetic relatedness of Klebsiella
pneumoniae isolates on the basis of their genome
sequences.
Results: The investigation comprises 37 cases and
the 10 cases with ESBL (extended-spectrum beta-
lactamase)-producing K. pneumoniae bloodstream
infection. Descriptive epidemiology indicated that a
continuous transmission from person to person was
most likely. Results from the cohort study showed that
‘frequent manipulation’ (a proxy for increased exposure
to medical procedures) was significantly associated
with being a case (RR 1.44, 95% CI 1.02 to 2.19).
Genome sequences revealed that all 48 bacterial
isolates available for sequencing from 31 cases were
closely related (maximum genetic distance, 12 single
nucleotide polymorphisms). Based on our calculation
of evolutionary rate and sequence diversity, we
estimate that the outbreak strain was endemic since
2008.
Conclusions: Epidemiological and phylogenetic
analyses consistently indicated that there were
additional, undiscovered cases prior to the onset of
microbiological screening and that the spread of the
pathogen remained undetected over several years,
driven predominantly by person-to-person
transmission. Whole-genome sequencing provided
valuable information on the onset, course and size of
the outbreak, and on possible ways of transmission.
INTRODUCTION
On 28 February 2012, a German neonatal
intensive care unit (NICU) was closed due to
a large outbreak of ESBL-producing Klebsiella
pneumonia. It has remained closed ever since
(as on February 2015).1 In total, 37 infants
were affected by this outbreak. Among these,
10 cases developed a bloodstream infection.
Local public health authorities were first
informed of the outbreak in September 2011
and convened an infection control team.
The hospital conducted a press conference
on 2 November 2011 to inform the public
about the outbreak. From then the outbreak
was discussed in the media for months, and a
parliamentary commission of the Bremen
parliament was established.1 2 By the time
the media was informed, the index case was
suspected to be a neonate who tested positive
for the outbreak strain in July 2011.
Throughout the outbreak, control mea-
sures were established with emphasis on
Strengths and limitations of this study
▪ We highlight the complexity of nosocomial out-
breaks and outbreak investigations.
▪ We illustrate how microbiological and epidemio-
logical methods may uncover pieces of a puzzle
that only when taken together can resolve the
whole picture of an outbreak situation.
▪ Our study is limited to data and isolates collected
during the outbreak investigation. We could not
retrieve epidemiological data on all neonates and
had to make use of the available isolates col-
lected during the investigation.
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hand hygiene, contact precautions, cohorting, personal-
isation of all medication and care products, and limiting
access to the units (eg, patient visits were restricted to
parents). Admission of new infants in the NICU was
ceased and the ward was closed on 5 November 2011 for
renovation; all movable material was discarded. The
NICU reopened on 9 January 2012; however, five new
cases were detected in the NICU in February.
On 25 October 2011, a microbiological screening of
all infants in the NICU was introduced and then
extended to a twice weekly screening of all patients in
the paediatric clinic and an admission screening. More
than 270 staff members were screened twice, in
November 2011 and February 2012. Mothers on the
maternal ward were screened starting on 5 November
2011 (perianal swabs). Mothers and staff were all
screened negative for the outbreak strain. More than
650 environmental samples were collected from the
NICU, other paediatric wards, the maternity ward and
the delivery room (>350 in 2011 and >300 in 2012),
including air, water, disinfectants and medical products.
Only five environmental samples were ESBL-K. pneumo-
niae positive: a diaper scale, a sharps disposal, a baby
soother (used by a case) in 2011, a baby soother (used
by another case) and a cardboard box of gloves (9 days
after final closure of the ward) in 2012.
Outbreaks due to multidrug-resistant K. pneumoniae
have been reported particularly in NICUs.3–5 They may
be difficult to control as K. pneumoniae can colonise the
gastrointestinal tract of patients without causing signs of
infections,6 acting as reservoirs for continued transmis-
sion.7 8 Other German hospitals have faced K. pneumoniae
outbreaks, but we are not aware of a nosocomial outbreak
in Germany that drew comparable public attention and
that has led to similar drastic consequences.
OBJECTIVE
We investigated this large, complex outbreak by combin-
ing epidemiological analysis with whole-genome sequen-
cing. A combination of epidemiological analysis and
high-resolution, whole-genome sequencing has been
shown to be valuable for investigating outbreaks with
various bacterial pathogens, including K. pneumoniae.9–12
In particular, we aimed to retrospectively reconstruct the
timing of transmission events, date the start of the out-
break, and further elucidate possible sources in order to
understand why extensive measures and investigations
were insufficient to prevent new cases.1
METHODS
Setting
The paediatric clinic in Bremen, Germany, with about
160 beds, has more than 11 000 inpatients and about
40 000 outpatients per year, including paediatric surgery.
Neonates were treated in the NICU, the paediatric
intensive care unit (PICU), a paediatric surgical ward
and a rooming-in unit.
Confirmed case
Any patient treated in the paediatric clinic in Bremen
with the ESBL-K. pneumoniae outbreak strain (DNA
macrorestriction) detected prior to 15 May 2012.
Probable case
Patients having received treatment in the paediatric
clinic between 1 January 2011 and 15 May 2012, with
ESBL-K. pneumoniae record, but with no isolate available
for bacterial typing.
Data source
We extracted information from patient charts, the hos-
pital information system and the laboratory information
system, and performed a retrospective case search within
these data sources. Variables such as gestational age,
birth weight, sex, exposures (eg, alimentation, proce-
dures), outcomes (eg, microbiological findings), as well
as information on the mother and the delivery of all
cases belonging to the outbreak and all non-cases in the
cohort study were extracted.
Descriptive epidemiology was applied to all cases for
whom information was retrieved. Subsequently, we com-
pared cases born and identified between 1 January and
31 October 2011 to all neonates born during the same
time span, who received treatment in the paediatric
clinic for more than 12 h within the first 7 days of life
(standard data set for quality assessment).
A retrospective cohort study included infants who were in
the NICU between 9 February and 28 February 2012 to
analyse reoccurrence of the outbreak strain. The time of
exposure for cases was defined as time since birth or last
negative screening until 1 day before first detection of
ESBL-K. pneumoniae. The time of exposure for non-cases
was the length of hospital stay within the study period.
We tested the association of single exposures with being
a case, and tested combined variables as invasive mea-
sures and those exposures that led to frequent
manipulation.
Statistical analyses
We calculated relative risks and p values (significance
level of p<0.05) using Poisson regression in Stata (Stata
V.12: StataCorp LP; 2011).
Bacterial strain typing
All conserved ESBL-K. pneumoniae that had been isolated
were analysed using DNA macrorestriction with XbaI and
subsequent pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) was
performed as previously described13 (see online supple-
mentary methods).
Genome sequencing
We generated a reference genome sequence for the out-
break strain from isolate K. pneumoniae 234/12 (Pacific
Biosciences, 454/Roche, and Illumina technologies; see
online supplementary methods). For annotation, we
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used the RAST web pipeline (http://rast.nmpdr.org/)14
and the PHAST tools.15
Resequencing of DNA from 46 K. pneumoniae isolates
was performed by applying Illumina technology (see
online supplementary methods). We mapped the result-
ing paired-end reads to the reference genome sequence
to identify sequence variation (see online supplementary
methods). We inferred multilocus sequence types (STs)
from genome sequences. Sequence data were submitted
to the Sequence Read Archive at NCBI (BioProject
PRJNA 235888; http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sra).
Phylogenetic analyses
An alignment of core genome single nucleotide poly-
morphisms (SNPs) assisted in the reconstruction of the
isolates’ phylogeny using the PhyML module in Seaview,
V.4.2.3. We then estimated evolutionary rates and diver-
gence dates from an alignment of genome sequence
dates with the isolates’ recovery dates, by using BEAST
V.1.7.4 (http://beast.bio.ed.ac.uk; see online supplemen-
tary methods).
Ethics
A formal ethical review process and approval was not
required for this outbreak investigation in accordance
with article 25, section 1 of the German Infection
Protection Act of 2001.
RESULTS
Descriptive epidemiological analysis
In total, we identified 37 cases (31 (84%) confirmed
cases and 6 (16%) probable cases (epidemiological data
were retrievable for 35 (95%) cases)). Using retrospect-
ive case search we identified 6 cases (2 confirmed and 4
probable) that were tested ESBL-K. pneumoniae positive
prior to the supposed index case (case 12, July 2011).
There were 46 isolates available for sequencing: 38 iso-
lates from 31 cases, 5 environmental isolates and 2 iso-
lates from patients from the hospital without
epidemiological link and 1 isolate of a similar strain
from Poland.
The majority (n=33, 89%) of cases was born preterm
(gestational age, <37+0), 10 (27%) cases developed a
bloodstream infection with the outbreak strain, and 7
(19%) died (all-cause mortality).
Between 30 April 2011 and 28 February 2012, at least
one case was permanently hospitalised in the paediatric
clinic; 65% of cases were on the same ward as another
case within 7 days prior to first detection, and 90% of
cases had been treated in the NICU (figure 1).
We analysed a data set of neonates born between
January and November 2011 and treated in the paediat-
ric clinic (n=310, including 20 cases). The cases had a
lower birth weight and a lower gestational age, and
developed sepsis significantly more often than non-cases
(table 1). However, when adjusted for birth weight and
Figure 1 Timeline of the outbreak. The index patient (case 1), isolate from ≈01.01.2009 (day 1 of the outbreak) was
retrospectively found to belong to the outbreak. Eight hundred and fifty days later the second case was tested positive. Black line
between day 1 and day 827 represents time span with no additional information on cases. Time intervals of 10 days between
vertical lines compressed whenever additional information was not lost. Data on case 37 are not presented in this figure. (Note:
After discharge many infants came back to hospital for day hospital visits during which they were treated by members of the
same team treating infants on neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) and paediatric intensive care unit. Sixty-five per cent of cases
were on the same ward as another case within 7 days prior to first detection. Thirty-three cases were exposed to the NICU.)
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gestational age, the association with sepsis was no longer
significant (RR 1.50; 95% CI 0.56 to 4.02).
Cohort study
Twenty infants were included in this cohort, comprising
5 cases and 15 non-cases. One case had a Klebsiella sepsis
and two cases died. Birth weight, gestational age and
gender did not differ significantly between cases and
controls. Analysing exposures we found a significant
association with the combined variables as proxy for ‘fre-
quent manipulation’ (RR 1.44; 95% CI 1.02 to 2.19 for 1
point increase). Infants had up to 10 points in the com-
bined variable, indicating an increased risk up to 14-fold
of becoming a case (table 2).
Genetic population structure
ST514 had not been observed in Germany previously, but
was reported in two neonatal patients at a university hos-
pital in Poland in 1996.16 De novo genome sequencing of
our isolate 234/12 by combining Pacific Biosciences and
Illumina sequencing technologies revealed that the out-
break strain displayed large-scale genomic differences to
the ‘historic’ ST514 isolate (316/12) from 1996, includ-
ing the acquisition and/or restructuring of prophages.
We then resequenced the genomes from 46 K. pneumo-
niae isolates by applying Illumina sequencing technology
(see online supplementary table S1), and polymorphisms
in the core genome were identified by mapping sequen-
cing reads to the genome sequence from the reference
isolate 234/12. All 44 ST514 outbreak isolates carried the
ESBL gene blaCTX-M-15 and the β-lactamase genes blaTEM-1
and blaSHV-63. All these isolates were resistant to ampicil-
lin, cefotaxime and ceftazidime, but they were susceptible
to carbapenems (see online supplementary table S1).
Among ST514 isolates from the outbreak in the paedi-
atric clinic, we discovered a total of only 61 SNPs, illustrat-
ing their close relationship. Two short runs of adjacent
SNPs (each consisting of 2 SNPs with a distance on the
chromosome of 84 and 358 base pairs, respectively) and
one homoplasious SNP (see online supplementary
table S2) were signatures of potential recombination
events. For phylogenetic analyses, we removed these five
potentially recombined SNPs from the data set to avoid
any obfuscation of the phylogenetic signal. Of the
remaining 56 SNPs, 13 were parsimony-informative (ie,
they occurred in >1 haplotype), enabling the reconstruc-
tion of a unique phylogenetic tree (homoplasy index, 0.0;
figure 2). When this tree was rooted with the genome
from an older ST514 isolate (316/12, Poland, 1996), the
earliest isolate from the paediatric clinic (267/12, from
2009) sat closest to the root (see online supplementary
figure S1). In a minimum spanning tree for our data set
Table 1 Comparison of cases with non-cases
Cases (n=20) Non-cases (n=290) RR* 95% CI p Value
Sex Male 13 (65%) 149 (51%) 1.69 0.63 to 5.02 0.36
Multiples Yes 8 (40%) 76 (26%) 1.79 0.64 to 4.77 0.30
Birth weight (g) Median (range) 1105 (620–2640) 2400 (468–4,87) 0.26 0.14 to 0.49 <0.001
Gestational age (weeks) Median (range) 27+5 (24+2–36+2) 35+6 (24+3–42+6) 0.77 0.695 to 0.858 <0.001
Fatalities† Yes 4 (20%) 22 (8%) 2.73 0.66 to 8.46 0.16
Sepsis Yes/no 9 (45%) 41 (14%) 4.25 1.56 to 11.29 0.005
Twenty cases born and identified between 1 January and 31 October 2011, and 290 non-cases born in the same time period treated in the
paediatric clinic, univariable analysis.
*Relative risk (RR) and p values calculated using Poisson regression or exact Poisson regression (where possible) and corresponding 95% CI.
†All fatalities among cases and non-cases counted, not differentiating causes.
Table 2 Cohort study 2012; selected devices and procedures during the study period (9 February to 28 February 2012)
Personal characteristics, exposure Cases (n=5) Non-cases (n=15) RR CI p Value
Sex Male 3 (60%) 7 (47%) 1.5 0.2 to 18.0 1.00
Multiples Yes/no 0 (0%) 2 (13%) 1.3 0.0 to 9.82 1.00
Birth weight (g) Median (range) 1800 (498–3000) 2300 (613–4210) 1.0 1.0 to 1.0 0.50
Gestational age (weeks+days) Median (range) 31+2 (24+2–36+3) 34+2 (24+1–42+1) 0.9 0.7 to 1.1 0.21
Central venous catheter Yes 4 (80%) 6 (40%) 4.0 0.4 to 197.0 0.38
Umbilical catheter Yes 4 (80%) 2 (13%) 9.3 0.9 to 459.6 0.06
Arterial catheter Yes 3 (60%) 0 (0%) 8.5 1.0 to 101.8 0.05
Mechanical ventilation Yes 3 (60%) 4 (27%) 2.8 0.3 to 33.4 0.47
Surfactant Yes 3 (60%) 2 (13%) 4.5 0.5 to 53.9 0.21
‘Frequent manipulation’ (0–10)* Median (range) 7 (4–10) 4 (0–7) 1.4 1.0 to 2.2 0.04
Univariable exact Poisson regression and corresponding 95% CI.
*Combined variables as proxy for ‘frequent manipulation’ (administration of eye drops (1)+continuous positive airway pressure (1)+radiograph
(1)+ECG (1)+physiotherapy (1)+umbilical catheter (1)+central venous catheter (1)+arterial catheter (1)+urinary catheter (1)+administration of
surfactant (1)+mechanical ventilation (1)+blood transfusion (1)).
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of 43 isolates, 40 isolates clustered in three clades (clades
1, 2 and 3; figure 3) that were fully congruent with clades
in a maximum-likelihood tree (figure 2). However, the
minimum spanning tree allowed ancestral isolates to
occupy internal nodes, which may reflect the underlying
transmission tree more closely.17 While DNA macrores-
triction (PFGE) enabled identification of the outbreak
strain, pulsotype subgroups differing from each other by
one or two bands were not concordant with SNP-based
phylogeny, since several of these subgroups were found in
more than one of the three phylogenetic clades
(figure 2).
Evolutionary rate and age of outbreak strain
Based on our set of genome sequences from isolates
that had been sampled serially over time, we estimated
that this K. pneumoniae strain has accumulated point
mutations in its core genome at a rate of three muta-
tions per genome and year (5.5×10−7 substitutions per
nucleotide site and year; 95% CI 2.9×10−7 to 8.4×10−7).
This short-term evolutionary rate is similar to rates
recently reported for Clostridium difficile,18 Mycobacterium
tuberculosis19 and Vibrio cholerae,20 but lower than that of
Staphylococcus aureus.21 22 Based on this evolutionary rate
and the sequence diversity of our data set, the time
estimation of the most recent common ancestor of the
K. pneumoniae outbreak strain was the beginning of 2008
(95% CI 2006 to 2009). Of note, virtually the same rate
and dates were calculated after removal of the single
isolate from 2009.
Diversity of K. pneumoniae within individual patients
From each of six individual patients, two to three isolates
were available. In two of these cases (patients 16 and
35), two to three isolates collected up to 65 days apart
had fully identical genomes, and in two cases (patients
34 and 29), the isolates sampled 93 and 112 days apart,
respectively, differed by one to two SNPs (figure 2). This
result is consistent with the average short-term evolution-
ary rate and suggests that the diversity within individual
patients may be low. In contrast, two isolates from
patient 17 collected 127 days apart differed by nine-
point mutations, yet clustered together in the phylogen-
etic tree (figure 2). Two isolates from patient 12
sampled 138 days apart were affiliated with separate clus-
ters in the phylogenetic tree (figure 2). These findings
could be due to reinfection with a related strain and/or
the continuous presence of diverse pathogen popula-
tions within these individuals.
Figure 2 Maximum-likelihood phylogenetic tree based on sequence variation in the core genome (5.2 Mio base pairs) from
ESBL-producing Klebsiella pneumoniae isolates representing the outbreak investigated. The tree was rooted by using isolate
316/12 (ST514, collected in Poland in 1996). Patient numbers, environmental sample numbers and isolation dates are indicated.
Where multiple isolates from individual patients were available, these are numbered consecutively. Phylogenetic clades 1, 2 and
3 are indicated. SNP, single nucleotide polymorphism; ST, sequence type.
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DISCUSSION
Epidemiological links and microbiological results
suggest an outbreak of 37 affected infants
(31 confirmed cases). ST514 has not been reported
from other sites in Germany, including hospitals, which
indicates that this ST is rare. We provide evidence for a
person-to-person transmission and for undetected cases,
which helps to better understand why the extensive
hygiene measures may have been insufficient to stop
transmission.
Extent of the outbreak
Our investigation indicates that undetected cases must
have occurred within the paediatric clinic prior to the
onset of microbiological screening. Before screening was
introduced, cases were identified only if they had devel-
oped signs of infection or if mechanical ventilation had
prompted a microbiological screening (it was current
practice on the ward to perform microbiological screen-
ing of sputum in mechanically ventilated infants).
Accordingly, the proportion of cases with Klebsiella sepsis
was 50% before implementation of screening, decreas-
ing to 10% after. When microbiological screening
started in the NICU (25 October 2011), seven new cases
were detected within 12 days, also suggesting a formerly
high prevalence of undetected cases. One case, a term-
born infant who had stayed in the NICU in June 2011,
in whom the colonisation with the outbreak strain was
only detected in December 2011, after the infant had
been actively screened for ESBL-K. pneumoniae months
after discharge. No other risk factors had been reported
for this case, leaving the stay in the NICU the most
plausible time of outbreak strain acquisition (figure 1).
Accordingly, outbreak isolates sampled in 2011 dis-
played considerable genomic diversity, since all three
clades (figure 3) were already present, and the multifur-
cation point in the minimum spanning tree (labelled
with an asterisk in figure 3) reflects the lack of speci-
mens from before 2011.
Before the introduction of microbiological screening,
the timeframe during which transmission could occur
was often long (up to 445 days). Extensive barrier pre-
cautions were not in place during time periods in which
carriers of the outbreak strain remained undetected.
Risk factors for being a case in our investigation were
low gestational age and low birth weight, which confirms
risk factors identified in previous outbreak reports.11
Beginning of the outbreak
The spread of the pathogen remained undetected for
approximately 3 years. Prior to our retrospective case
search, the outbreak was assigned a start date of 22 July
2011. However, we were able to identify earlier cases,
including one from 2009: Based on genome sequence
variation that we found among outbreak isolates and
considering the evolutionary rate at which point
Figure 3 Minimum spanning tree (constructed by using Bionumerics software) based on the same sequence data as the
maximum-likelihood tree in figure 2. The root of the tree was determined by comparison to the genome from isolate 316/12
(ST514, collected in Poland in 1996). Colours indicate isolation dates. Where multiple isolates from individual patients were
available, these are numbered consecutively. Phylogenetic clades 1, 2 and 3 are indicated. The asterisk marks the multifurcation
point in the tree that is referred to in the text (ST, sequence type).
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mutations accumulated over time, we estimated that the
outbreak strain had been endemic in the hospital since
2008.
Pathogen reservoir and transmission pathways
Person-to-person pathogen spread is most likely, although
we could not directly identify a responsible vehicle of
transmission. The outbreak strain was continuously
present in the NICU during the study period (figure 1).
Genome sequence data supported patient-to-patient
transmission as the principle route of pathogen spread,
since in the minimum spanning tree (figure 3) all but
one furcation nodes in clades 1, 2 and 3 are occupied by
isolates sampled from patients, rather than from parents,
staff or any environmental source. In contrast, repeated
introductions of the pathogen from a common source
would have resulted in a star-like tree, and introductions
from multiple external sources would have resulted in
greater diversity that would have been only partially
represented by the strain collection from the ward.
Evidence of the critical role of hand hygiene was pro-
vided by the cohort study, which showed a significant
association with the compound score for ‘frequent
manipulation’ (table 2). When environmental investiga-
tions were intensified, increased numbers of pathogens
(not the outbreak strain) were detected on personnel
hands, gowns and hand contact places (ie, pager or box
of gloves).
Understaffing and overcrowding have repeatedly been
described as risk factors for increased infection rates
and the occurrence of outbreaks.23 Nonetheless, the
median patient/nurse ratio in the NICU in 2011 was
3.0, and repeatedly one nurse had to take care of more
than five neonates (data not shown).
Drastic measures were implemented to control the
outbreak during the last months of 2011, including stop-
ping admissions, closure and renovation of the NICU.
Nevertheless, phylogenetic clades 2 and 3 were present
before and after reopening of the NICU (figures 2
and 3). Moreover, the positions of isolates from 2012
in the minimum spanning tree show that at least two
different genotypes (cases 32–36, clades 2 and 3;
figure 3) were introduced into the ward following the
renovation.
Repeated screenings of staff did not detect any
ESBL-producing K. pneumoniae. Likewise, the outbreak
strain was neither detected among mothers on the
maternal ward nor among patients from other wards, or
from other hospitals within the area. It is unlikely that
the outbreak clone was endemic in the wider geographic
area. Genomic relatedness of K. pneumoniae isolates sup-
ported the notion that patients constituted a reservoir
for the pathogen, as several neonates were colonised
with unique strains for several months (figure 2).
Notably, closely related isolates were collected from each
of two patients (cases 17 and 29) before and after reno-
vation of the NICU (figure 2), suggesting that the patho-
gen may have been reintroduced into the NICU by
person-to-person transmission. Case 29 was rehospita-
lised in the PICU 20 days before birth of case 32. Case
17 was rehospitalised in the PICU only 1 day before
birth of case 32. Further undetected cases hospitalised
in 2012 may have reintroduced the outbreak strain
through outpatient visits in 2012.
Environmental investigation
Environmental screenings yielded five K. pneumoniae
isolates that were closely related to the outbreak strain
(see online supplementary table S1). Coincidentally,
genomes from these isolates (sampled from a box of
gloves, a diaper scale, a sharps disposal and baby sooth-
ers, respectively) occupied peripheral positions of the
minimum spanning tree (figure 2), ruling out these con-
taminated materials as spreading hubs. The finding of
the outbreak strain in a box of gloves 9 days after closure
of the ward demonstrates the remarkable viability of
Klebsiella on inanimate surfaces. Additional boxes of
gloves (including unopened ones) tested negative, sug-
gesting that the single positive tested box of gloves was
most likely contaminated by insufficiently disinfected
hands. Tests performed by a specialised laboratory
showed that the outbreak strain was sensitive to the disin-
fectants used in the clinic.
LIMITATIONS
Most data on exposures were collected from patient
records. Within these we found systematic inconsisten-
cies in documentation and missing data on epidemiolo-
gically important information, like room number,
attending personnel and incubator number. Use of skin
disinfectant (eg, for umbilical cord care) was more fre-
quently documented in known cases than in non-cases,
even though a standard procedure applied to all new-
borns. Furthermore, by extending barrier precautions
and moving the NICU, medical procedures and thereby,
the exposures may have changed.
While genome sequencing provided improved discrim-
inatory power when compared with other typing
methods,9 11 12 the short-term evolutionary rate in
K. pneumoniae of three base substitution per genome per
year on average, as measured here, is unlikely to allow the
reliable tracking of specific transmission events between
individuals, which occur on much shorter time scales.
Resolution could have likely been improved by including
multiple isolates from each individual neonate, which
were not sufficiently available in the present investigation.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Late detection and thereby, delayed extensive response
may have contributed to the difficulties in controlling
this outbreak. Our analyses suggest that there were
numerous unknown cases and that measures, such as
cohorting and barrier nursing, were only applied to
known cases. The outbreak spread from the NICU to
other wards of the paediatric clinic, and readmissions of
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known and unknown cases may have reintroduced the
outbreak strain into the NICU.
While in the present analysis, extensive sequencing
was applied retrospectively only, genomic diversity of K.
pneumoniae isolates from patients and environmental
samples clearly indicated that the duration and extent of
the outbreak had been underestimated. Further,
sequence data provided evidence for the patients being
the reservoir of the pathogen and it ruled out environ-
mental contamination as a major route of spread.
Surveillance systems for outbreak detection with stan-
dardised evaluation of pathogen clusters should be
established, especially on wards with highly susceptible
populations. Having this valuable information during
real-time outbreak situations would improve infection
control and prevention measures by elucidating the start
and extent of the outbreak, confirming possible trans-
mission routes and identifying most probable sources.
Since January 2012, the German Commission for
Hospital Hygiene and Infectious Disease Prevention
(KRINKO) recommends weekly microbiological screen-
ing for multiresistant Gram-negative pathogens and
Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) in all
very low birthweight infants (<1500 g) in Germany.24 25
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